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In opposition to the facts and legal argument set forth in Appellant's Brief, there 
are two general themes that emerge from Appellees' Briefs. First, it is claimed that 
Farr's summary judgment motion was based entirely on new theories of liability that 
were not pleaded in any complaint nor raised at any time prior to the summary judgment 
motions themselves. Second, that because Reed, and Reed only, had contact with Fair all 
other insurance agents and insurers are relived from liability in this matter. 
It is significant to keep in mind that the trial court did not decide this case on the 
merits, but rather on summary judgment. Consequently, all facts must viewed in a light 
most favorable to Fair when reviewing the propriety of the trial court's rulings. 
The Issues Raised In Farr's Summary Judgment Motion Were Not New Theories Of 
Liability And Should Have Been Considered By The Trial Court 
As was set forth in Farr's opening brief, the trial court did not address Farr's 
claims relating to breach of the oral binder and policy ambiguity. The oral binder claim 
is central to Farr's case. Farr asserts the trial court's failure to consider and rule on these 
claims was error. 
In Canfield v. Layton City, 122 P.3d 622, 625 (Utah 2005), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
A plaintiff is required, under our liberal standard of notice pleading, 
to submit a "short and plain statement ... showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment for the relief." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(l)-(2). The plaintiff must only give the defendant "fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type 
of litigation involved." 
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Fair certainly provided the notice required under Rule 8 and the Canfield decision. 
Paragraph 21 of Plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint, sets forth: 
21. On and before May 14, 2003, Reed, while acting both for 
himself and as the duly authorized agent for TIE, Trustco, Safeco, 
American, Hartford, Kirchen, Central Agency, Central Bonds and Auto-
Owners ("Primary Defendants"), had received payment for and 
affirmatively represented to plaintiff (a) that the Primary Defendants had 
duly bound and provided plaintiff with all necessary and appropriate 
insurance coverage for all of plaintiff s significant insurable risks, including 
all insurable risks related to Plaintiffs Products, and (b) that the Primary 
Defendants, and each, of them had agreed, committed, and became jointly 
obligated to provide plaintiff with all such necessary, available and 
appropriate insurance coverage for all of Plaintiffs Products and all of 
plaintiffs significant insurable risks ("Reed's Commitment"), effective 
May 14,2003.* (R. 299) 
Paragraph 21 from Farr's complaint clearly provides fair notice of the nature and 
basis or grounds of Farr's claims and a general indication of the type of litigation 
involved. The following information can readily be gleaned from Paragraph 21: 
1) That Reed, while acting for himself and for the Primary Defendants 
received payment for insurance coverage for Farr's products; 
2) That insurance coverage had been bound by Reed and the Primary 
Defendants (emphasis added); 
3) That representations were made that the bound coverage provided Fair with 
all necessary and appropriate insurance coverage related to Farr's products; and 
1
 Some of the opposing parties raise the issue of Reed's Commitment occurring "on or 
before May 14, 2003" asserting that Trustco, Safeco and Hartford did not become 
involved until after this date. The facts of the case, however, establish that Reed's 
involvement occurred both before and after May 14, 2003, and due to the circumstances 
that arose after May 14, 2003, Reed's Commitment later involved Trustco, Safeco and 
Hartford in what became an evolving common enterprise. 
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4) That by virtue of Reed's Commitment, the Primary Defendants, and each of 
them had agreed, committed, and became jointly obligated to provide plaintiff with all 
such necessary, available and appropriate insurance coverage for all of Plaintiffs 
Products and all of plaintiff s significant insurable risks. 
Paragraphs 22-24 of Fair's complaint state as follows: 
22. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon said affirmative 
representations, and as a result thereof plaintiff was reasonably lead to 
believe that it did not need to read any insurance policies it was provided 
with, or to have an insurance expert read and interpret any such insurance 
policy for the plaintiff. 
23. As of and before May 14, 2003, appropriate insurance 
coverage for all of the aforementioned plaintiffs significant insurable risks 
was then readily available at a reasonable cost. 
24. In connection with and as a consequence of Reed's 
Commitment, the Primary Defendants, and each of them, thereby became 
jointly and severally obligated to perform and satisfy each of the following 
affirmative duties then owed by them to plaintiff: 
a) to diligently and professionally investigate and accurately 
determine the full nature and extent of each and all of plaintiff s significant 
insurable risks, and to fully advise plaintiff of the same; 
b) to diligently and professionally investigate and accurately 
determine the full nature and extent of the insurance coverage that was 
available to cover such risks, to determine the cost thereof, and to fully 
advise plaintiff of the same; and 
c) to insure that plaintiff was fully informed and provided with 
all of such coverage, or to confirm in writing plaintiffs deteimination, if 
any, after being so informed not to avail itself of such available coverage, 
or any portion thereof, not provided. 
(R. 300) 
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Farr thereafter alleged claims against the Primary Defendants including claims for 
breach of contract, negligence and equitable estoppel. Accordingly, a fair reading of 
Farr's complaint establishes that Fair alleged that the Primary Defendants were acting 
together (in what amounted to a common enterprise) in binding coverage for Farr. 
Notwithstanding the above, the trial court expressly stated it would not consider 
the "oral binder" issue which is one of the primary issues from which Farr's claims stem. 
The parties were on full and fair notice of Farr's oral binder claims. In fact, the issue was 
fully briefed and argued before the trial court. At the very least the trial court should 
have determined whether contested facts existed in relation to the oral binder, what 
coverage was actually bound, and what representations were made during the oral binder 
process. The trial court did not do so. Consequently, it was error for the trial court to 
grant summary judgment without fully considering each of Farr's claims. On this basis 
alone, the trial court's ruling on the summary judgment motions should be reversed. 
Reed's Interaction With The Other Primary Defendants 
In their oppositions, much is made of the fact that only Reed had any direct 
dealings with Farr. Based upon the circumstances in this case (especially when viewed in 
a light most favorable to Farr), such a fact is not surprising. 
Prior to the issues which arose in this matter, Reed had insurance dealings with 
Farr. In fact, Reed was Farr's insurance agent in relation to other lines of coverage which 
Reed had provided to Fair (although that other coverage was of a different type of 
insurance coverage from the type of coverage involved in this case). Naturally, Reed 
wanted to obtain and continue to service all of Farr's insurance business as its agent. The 
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fact that Reed is the only agent/insurance provider who had any direct contact and 
dealing with Fair compels the conclusion that Reed acted for and in behalf of all of the 
other Appellees as their agents as a matter of law. All parties to business transactions 
obviously deal with the other party or parties to a transaction by either dealing themselves 
directly with the other party or parties or through their agents who in turn deal for them 
with the other parties. Accordingly, Reed must be deemed to have acted as all of the 
Appellees' agent. 
Reed tried to get his company (Farmers) to provide Farr's property and liability 
coverage, however, Farmers apparently declined to do so. Reed failed to advise Farr of 
that fact. Because Farr's prior coverage was expiring, Reed wanted to get Farr's 
coverage bound quickly. As Farmers would not provide the coverage, Reed called 
business acquaintance and fellow insurance agent Kirchen requesting his help in placing 
the coverage. Kirchen worked with insurance agency Central Bonds. Kirchen and 
Central Bonds are both agents of insurance company Auto Owners. Kirchen and Reed 
worked together in an effort to obtain coverage for Farr. Kirchen was not required to 
work with Reed, but he voluntarily chose to do so. Kirchen could readily have met 
directly with Farr but he voluntarily chose not to do so. Kirchen thereby acted through 
Reed, who in turn was acting as Kirchen's, Central Bond's and Auto Owners' agent 
binding Farr's coverage with Auto Owners. It is likely Reed did not want Kirchen 
directly involved with Farr because that could have damaged Farr's perception that Reed 
was the only agent providing the coverage. 
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As Kirchen never had any contact with Farr, Kirchen could only have received 
information about Fair's coverage from Reed. Kirchen and Reed jointly prepared a 
proposal setting forth insurance coverage for Farr which would be provided by Auto 
Owners. The proposal was provided to Farr by Reed, and thereafter Reed collected a 
check payable to "Owners" and presented that check to Kirchen. Reed testified that 
Kirchen told him they were "in the binder period" with Owners. Kirchen later learned 
Auto Owners would not honor the coverage Reed and Kirchen bound for Farr and 
returned Fair's check to Reed. Auto Owners never provided Farr with a written 
cancellation notice in relation to the coverage with Auto Owners which was jointly bound 
by Reed and Kirchen as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-21-102(5). 
There is no question that Kirchen, as an agent, was authorized to act for both 
Central Bonds and Auto Owners. Kirchen's acts could (and did in fact) bind Central 
Bonds and Auto Owners. In this case, Kirchen unquestionably chose to act through 
Reed. Kirchen obtained information about Farr from Reed. Kirchen had Reed provide 
the Auto Owner's insurance coverage information to Farr. Finally, Kirchen had Reed 
collect the premium check from Farr. In all material respects, Kirchen allowed Reed to 
complete the tasks Kirchen would have otherwise completed on his own in relation to the 
Farr transaction. In essence, Kirchen allowed Reed to be both his and Auto Owner's 
agent in the Farr transaction. 
Reed was Kirchen's agent, and Kirchen was vested with the authority and in fact 
bound Central Bonds and Auto Owners by virtue of the agency relationship that came 
into existence between Kirchen and Reed and the statutory relationship that thereby came 
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into being between Reed and Kirchen as joint insurance providers, on the one hand, and 
Farr, on the other hand. No action was ever taken by or on behalf of Auto Owners to 
cancel the coverage for Farr which Reed stated Kirchen bound. Because of these legal 
relationships, the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of Kirchen, Central 
Bonds and Auto Owners was not warranted. 
After Reed learned that Auto Owners had improvidently claimed it would not 
honor the Farr insurance coverage, Kirchen placed Reed in contact with insurance agent 
Granger who worked with insurance agency Trustco. Granger and Trustco are both 
Safeco agents. 
Because Reed claimed that Farr was without insurance coverage, Reed sought to 
have coverage bound by Granger and Trustco for Farr immediately. To do this, Granger 
had Reed obtain a "broker of record" letter which named Trustco sis Fair's exclusive 
broker of record with Safeco. Granger was not required to work with Reed, but he chose 
to do so. Granger could have met and dealt directly with Farr, but he voluntarily chose to 
have Reed handle the transaction on Granger's, Trustco's and Safeco's behalf. Granger 
used Reed to obtain necessary information to bind coverage for Farr. There is no 
question that Granger, through Trustco, had Fair's coverage bound with Safeco on May 
23, 2003. Moveover, Granger specifically testified that he told Safeco5s underwriter "to 
go with all coverages". 
It is not questioned that during the intervening period between when Safeco bound 
Fair's coverage and the date of Fair's loss, that Safeco requested additional information 
about the coverage to be provided to Farr. Safeco indicated it did not have a complete 
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submission and that applications would need to be submitted as to what coverages were 
desired. Rather than Granger contacting Farr, he contacted Reed to obtain that 
information. The record shows that Reed and Granger were working together to provide 
information to Safeco on May 28, 2003, the day before Farr's loss. Reed, Granger and 
Trustco, acted jointly as agents/insurance providers in binding the Safeco coverage for 
Fair. 
The record further establishes that Safeco's underwriter called Granger again on 
May 29, 2003 because, as Granger testified, "There were discrepancies between this 
submission that we sent and [what had been submitted earlier] . . . . with regard to other 
coverage lines, umbrella and also equipment breakdown. . . . and the emphasis was on 
getting this into Safeco so that coverage may not he compromised." (emphasis added) 
Safeco's underwriter requested a supplemental application for equipment breakdown and 
umbrella coverage, stating coverage for these had not been requested in the Jones 
submission. Granger again contacted Reed for assistance in putting the requested 
supplemental application together. Granger raised no question with Reed as to ice cream 
inventory coverage: "I was not in a position at that time to question him about what his 
client wanted because it was his client and he was coming to me with what his client 
wanted." "[H]e assured me that he would prefer that he just be the only one that deals 
with them because of the relationship he had with them." (R. 2201 at [^57.) Farr's loss 
occurred that very day, during the time Safeco was still attempting to determine coverage 
amounts. 
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Fair's Motion For Summary Judgment 
Based upon the foregoing facts, Farr moved for summary judgment against Reed, 
Trustco, Safeco and Hartford. It is uncontested that Fair's coverage was bound with 
Safeco. It is also uncontested that neither Reed, nor Granger, nor Trustco, nor Safeco, 
nor Hartford ever communicated any coverage limitation or exclusion to Farr in relation 
to the coverage Safeco bound. 
Trustco and Safeco were not required to bind the coverage. They voluntarily 
chose to do so based upon the information they had in their possession which was 
provided to Granger by Reed. When Trustco and Safeco bound the coverage without 
providing any exclusion or limitation language they did so at their own risk. It was not 
until after the loss that Farr was provided with a policy which was based upon Safeco, 
American and Hartford's self serving and wholly unsupportable post loss underwriting. 
As Trustco and Safeco bound coverage without providing Farr notice of any 
exclusions or limitations for coverage, as a matter of law Trustco and Safeco are liable 
for the full amount of Fair's loss because such coverage was readily available from the 
insurance marketplace at the time of and for such a loss. 
The opposition argues that Fair is not entitled to "full coverage" for losses it 
sustained during the binder period, but rather, is only entitled to what coverage is 
"contained in the ordinary form of policy issued by the company at that time upon similar 
risks." 
There are three problems with such reasoning based upon the facts of this case. 
First, the Farr policy was a business policy. It is highly questionable whether there even 
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exists an "ordinary form of policy55 that Safeco would have used for an ice cream 
manufacturer. Second, the opposition has failed to provide a copy of their claimed 
"ordinary form of policy55 to enable the trial court to accurately determine the nature and 
extent the coverages Farr would have been provided by any such policy. Third, and more 
important, Safeco was, both before and after the date of the loss, determining what 
coverage would be evidenced by the express terms of the policy it was obligated to issue 
to Farr. 
Safeco is a sophisticated insurer. It is in the business to evaluate risk. Other 
insurance companies declined to bind coverage because they believed they needed more 
information to evaluate the risk. Safeco, however, elected to bind the coverage in a very 
short period. It is inequitable for Farr to suffer an uncovered loss when the Farr 
insurance coverage was in force, and no notice was provided to Farr that its bound 
coverage was subject to any exclusions or limitations. 
Remaining Motions For Summary Judgment 
The simple fact in this case is that the insurance agents, agencies and companies 
dealt with Farr only through Reed. The testimony of Reed, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to Farr establishes that Reed believed the typical Farmers policy had a default 
coverage limit for equipment breakdown/spoilage claims in the same amounts as for the 
property coverage limits. Based on Reed5s reasoning, Fair's limit in this case would have 
been $7.8 million dollars. Further, after the loss, Reed was very reassuring to Farr and 
indicated Farr was totally covered and that the insurance companies (Safeco, American 
States and Hartford) would be taking care of Fair's loss. Reed obviously then believed 
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the bound coverage Fair had was sufficient to cover Farr's potential losses. 
When Kirchen, Central Bonds and Trustco chose to act through Reed (which 
effectively meant Reed was acting for the insurance companies as well), these individuals 
and entities assumed the risk, and voluntarily relied upon the assumption that Reed's 
representations and actions would be appropriate. It is also true that no reasonable ice 
creftm manufacturer would intentionally have limited inventory coverage to $25,000.00 
when many times that amount was so obviously subject to potential loss. 
Insurance companies and agents are licensed by the State of Utah. The agents are 
insurance professionals. The opposition argues that agents have no duties to explain and 
recommend coverage to their clients. This simply cannot be true. Such a position is akin 
to saying surgeons, for example, have no duty to explain a procedure and recommend a 
course of action to their surgery patients, and to follow necessary procedures in order to 
provide the patient's needed care. While a physician has no obligation to accept a person 
as a patient, once that patient is accepted, there is a duty to treat that patient with 
reasonable care and to provide the patient with all of the patient's medical needs in a 
professional manner. A patient is not required to tell the physician how surgery should 
be performed or what medications are required or appropriate. That is why a physician 
must be qualified and licensed as a professional. 
Likewise, once an insurance agent and/or an insurance company accepts a client, 
that agent and/or insurance company, as a professional has a duty to explain what 
2
 The opposition argues that an earlier policy Fair had in force only provided limited 
coverage. The trial court made no specific finding on whether Fair's loss would have 
been covered under the earlier policy, and if so, in what amounts. 
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insurance coverage is available for the client's particular risks, and what risks are actually 
to be covered by a given policy. It is for that very purpose, more than any other, that all 
of such insurance producers are required to be fully qualified and licensed. 
The trial court erred when it failed to even consider Farr's claims related to the 
oral binder in this case. If the trial court had considered the oral binder, then Farr's 
summary judgment should have been granted. There is no question of fact that coverage 
was bound. It is also uncontested that no exclusion or limitation was ever provided to 
Farr after the coverage was bound and prior to Farr's loss. Consequently, the only 
remaining issue in this case should be the amount of coverage available under Safeco's 
"all coverages" binder. 
At the very least there are questions of fact surrounding the agency relationship 
between Reed and the other parties herein, whether coverage was bound, the type and 
amount of coverage that was bound, and the damages that have been sustained. For these 
reasons, summary judgment in favor of the appellees was not appropriate. 
The trial court's summary judgment determinations should be reversed and the 
case should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amount of damages 
Farr has sustained. At the very least, the case should be remanded to the trial court for a 
proper review of each of Farr's claims and to allow Farr to amend its complaint to name 
Travelers as a party herein.3 
3
 Farr moved the trial court to allow Farr to amend its complaint and name Travelers as a 
defendant in the case. The trial court denied Farr's motion on the basis of its other 
summary judgment rulings. Should this Court reverse the trial court's rulings, Farr 
should be entitled to name Travelers as a party defendant herein. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Farr requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
determination that the "oral binder" and "policy ambiguity" claims need not be 
considered, reverse the trial court's denial of Fair's motion for partial summary judgment 
on the issue of liability in relation to Reed, Trustco, Safeco and Hartford, and reverse the 
trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of appellees on the basis that 
questions of material fact remain to be decided. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z& day of May, 2008. 
Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
Attorneys For Petitioner/Appellant 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT was served upon the 
following individuals, by mail, postage prepaid, at the addresses shown below this Z°\ 
day of May, 2008. 
Aaron Alma Nelson 
Michael D. Lichfield 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, PAYNE & 
BURT 
50 West Broadway, Suite 950 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Michael F. Skolnick 
J. Kevin Murray 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Jonathan L. Hawkins 
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & 
JAMES, L.C. 
136 S. Main Street, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Gregory M. Saylin 
Leanne N. Webster 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 S. State Street, Twelfth Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0210 
Scott G. Johnson 
ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & 
CIRESI LLP 
2800 La Salle Plaza 
800 La Salle Avenue 
South Minneapolis, MN 55402-2015 
Lowell V. Smith 
Eric K. Davenport 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
1218 E 7800 S, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84094 
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Craig R. Mariger 
Bruce Wycoff 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Kevin S. Gardner 
EPPERSON & RENCHER 
10 W 100 S, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Jones and Blackburn Jones 
